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Abstract
We study the framework of Bayesian statistics for analyzing the capabilities and results of future
experiments looking to solve the issue of the neutrino mass ordering. Starting from the general
scenario, we then give examples of the procedure for experiments with Gaussian and non-Gaussian
distributions for the indicator. We describe in detail what can and cannot be said about the
neutrino mass ordering and a future experiment’s capabilities to determine it. Finally, we briefly
comment on the application to other binary measurements, such as the determination of the octant
of θ23.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the lepton mixing angle θ13 being discovered to be large [1–4], there has been
a surge of interest in the possibility of determining whether the neutrino mass ordering is
normal (NO) or inverted (IO) in the next or next-to-next generation of neutrino experiments.
Many studies of the capabilities for doing this in different types of experiments have been
performed, including atmospheric [5–28], reactor [27, 29–46], and long baseline [14, 19, 32,
47–66] neutrino experiments. Most of these studies take an approach where the neutrino
mass ordering is determined in a frequentist manner with the typical square root of the test
statistic used as a measure of the sensitivity as if the distribution of the test statistic was a χ2
distribution with one degree of freedom. The issue of how to deal with the fact that Wilks’
theorem [67] does not apply to a binary measurement has also been dealt with in different
ways in several studies [40, 45, 68, 69]. The statistical analysis of the ordering measurement
can be performed in either a frequentist or a Bayesian statistics setting. Although the
Bayesian method of model selection is ideally suited for the task, the neutrino community
is traditionally frequentist and more accustomed to interpreting frequentist results. Thus,
in choosing which approach to take, these two facts have to be weighted against each other.
It should be mentioned that the frequentist analysis can lead to some results that may be
considered unappealing, such as the rejection of both hierarchies at high confidence, there
is nothing wrong in performing it as long as proper care is taken in interpreting the results.
In this text we will concentrate on how to correctly perform the Bayesian analysis, both
as a method of interpreting actual results as well as for judging the capabilities of future
experiments. The frequentist approach will be discussed elsewhere [70].
The remainder of this paper has been organized as follows: We start by quickly reviewing
the Bayesian approach to model selection in Sec. II. In Sec. III we then specialize to the
situation where we have two models that we wish to compare, including definitions that we
will use later as well as an analytical treatment of the case where a Gaussian approximation
is valid. We continue by giving an example of a non-Gaussian situation in Sec. IV, where
we also briefly discuss a semi-analytic approach for the case when the distributions are
essentially sums of different Gaussian distributions. In this section we also discuss the prior
dependence of Bayesian analyses and its implications for decision making in future neutrino
oscillation experiments. Finally, in Sec. V, we discuss and summarize our results.
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II. BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION
Unlike frequentist statistics, which are only concerned with how probable outcomes were
given a hypothesis, Bayesian statistics deal with our degree of belief in a hypothesis. This
has both advantages and disadvantages, the main disadvantage being the introduction of
a final result which may depend on the prior knowledge that is inserted into the analysis.
However, in some cases it may be of interest to actually consider the prior and changes
to it as valuable tools at the design level of an experiment (see, e.g., Ref. [71]). Bayesian
model selection is performed as follows: Consider a situation where we have to select among
several different hypotheses Hi, all of which are mutually exclusive. Before any experiment is
performed, we assign a prior pii = P (Hi) to each hypothesis. These priors are quantifications
of our degree of belief in the different hypotheses before having any experimental input and
thus are typically chosen such that pii = pij unless some arguments can be applied for having
greater belief in one hypothesis than in the others (or if some other experiment has already
provided an indication that this is the case). In general
∑
i
pii ≤ 1, (1)
where the equality only holds if we are absolutely convinced that one of the hypotheses is
true. Once we have performed an experiment, we wish to update our degree of belief in
the different hypotheses by computing how likely each hypothesis is, this quantity is the
posterior probability P (Hi; t), i.e., the probability that Hi is true given an observation t.
What we are really interested in are the posterior odds
Odds(Hi, Hj; t) =
P (Hi; t)
P (Hj; t)
≡ pHi
pHj
. (2)
Central to Bayesian statistics, we now make use of Bayes’ theorem
P (A,B) = P (A;B)P (B) = P (B;A)P (A) ⇒ pHi ∝ LHi(t)pii (3)
to rewrite the odds as
Odds(Hi, Hj; t) =
LHi(t)
LHj(t)
pii
pij
. (4)
Here, LHi(t) is the likelihood of producing the observation t if the hypothesis Hi is true.
Thus, the posterior odds are simply updates of the prior odds such that each hypothesis is
weighted by how likely the outcome was given the hypothesis.
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In many situations, the hypotheses that are being treated are not simple, but rather
composed of a general model with one or several model parameters θ. In these cases, we
also need to assign a parameter prior piHi(θi) quantifying how likely each realization of
parameters are. The likelihood of the data is then in general dependent on the parameters
θi. However, the model likelihood is easily computable by weighting the likelihoods with the
parameter prior
LHi(t) =
∫
piHi(θi)LHi(t; θi) dθi. (5)
In general, the Bayesian approach would consider the data as is without referencing a
test statistic. However, by only considering a single observable T , we are going to simplify
the analysis significantly and this is just what we will do below. Since we are not dealing
with the frequentist notion of hypothesis testing, we will refrain from calling this T a test
statistic and instead refer to it as an indicator. This indicator will be well suited for telling
two hypotheses, Hi and Hj, apart if its distribution under the different hypotheses differ
significantly. Keeping this in mind, we now concentrate on the case at hand, where we want
to distinguish two given hypotheses (normal and inverted neutrino mass ordering). When
discussing the neutrino mass ordering at future neutrino oscillation experiments below, we
will assume that the indicator used is the quantity typically referred to as the ∆χ2:
T = ∆χ2 ≡ min
IO
χ2 −min
NO
χ2, (6)
where χ2 for given parameters is related to the likelihood L of the data according to χ2 =
−2 log(L), thus making T equivalent to the likelihood ratio of the best fit points in NO
and IO. We will continue calling this quantity T , since it does typically not follow a χ2
distribution.
III. SELECTING BETWEEN TWO HYPOTHESES
In particular, Bayesian model selection is very well suited for selecting between two mu-
tually exclusive hypotheses where we are essentially certain that one of them has to be true.
Such is the case of the neutrino mass ordering as was discussed by Qian et al. [68]. In this
section, we will largely follow their approach to analyze the Gaussian situation analytically
in detail and also discuss the modifications introduced in a non-Gaussian scenario. We
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will later comment on the different possibilities of evaluating the merits future oscillation
experiments based on Bayesian measures of sensitivity.
Let us first consider the general case, where the parameter space may be extended and the
distribution of the indicator typically displays non-gaussianities regardless of the gaussianity
of the underlying data. Once an experiment has been performed and resulted in a result
T = t, we need to compute the posterior odds of the hypotheses H and H¯ . By Bayes’
theorem, this will be given by
P (H ; t)
P (H¯; t)
=
LH(t)
LH¯(t)
piH
piH¯
=
p
1− p, (7)
where p = pH is the degree of belief in NO after making the observation t and we have
assumed pH + pH¯ = 1. Thus, in order to compute the posterior odds, compute the general
integral in Eq. (5). In general, this may be a non-trivial task to perform analytically.
However, it can be done numerically in a very straightforward fashion through simple Monte
Carlo simulation as follows:
1. If H is a composite hypothesis, sample parameter values θ from the parameter prior
piH(θ).
2. Generate a set of data under the assumption that H is true with parameters θ.
3. Compute and store the value of the indicator T given the data generated in 2.
4. Repeat 1 to 3 until a sufficient number of samples of T have been generated.
This procedure will result in a sample of the distribution of T under the assumption that
H is true. In some ways, this procedure is very similar to computing the distribution of a
test statistic in a frequentist analysis. The big difference is that we are allowed to compute
the distribution for H as a whole rather than being restricted to doing it for a particular
selection of parameters θ. The reason we can do this is that the prior piH(θ) has introduced
a valid way of properly weighting the contributions from different parameter values.
Once the likelihoods are known as a function of t and the posterior odds computed, we
can phrase our degree of belief in H by using either the Kass–Raftery [72] or Jeffrey [73]
scales. For comparison, it is useful to define the quantity
κ(t) = 2 log
(
P (H ; t)
P (H¯; t)
)
(8)
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Strength of evidence for H κ Posterior odds Degree of belief
Barely worth mentioning 0 to 2 ca 1 to 3 < 73.11%
Positive 2 to 6 ca 3 to 20 > 73.11%
Strong 6 to 10 ca 20 to 150 > 95.26%
Very strong > 10 >∼ 150 > 99.33%
TABLE I: The Kass–Raftery scale [72] for wording the strength of evidence for a hypothesis H.
For the remainder of this text, we will use the Kass–Raftery scale, see Tab. I, but also give
the degree of belief for reference.
A. Evaluating the performance of a future experiment
The Bayesian framework gives us the freedom of computing a series of interesting prob-
abilities already before an experiment has been performed. If we assume that H and H¯
are the only two possible hypotheses which are equally probable before performing the ex-
periment, then P (H) = P (H¯) = 0.5. As κ(T ) can be seen as the distribution of posterior
odds once the experiment is performed. We can, for example, compute the probability of
the experiment giving at least strong evidence (> 95.3%) for either ordering
P (|κ| > 6) = P (|κ| > 6;H)P (H) + P (|κ| > 6; H¯)P (H¯). (9)
This of course also includes the possibility of obtaining strong evidence for the wrong ordering
(corresponding to a degree of belief < 4.7% for the correct ordering), so the more interesting
quantity is
P (Strong correct) = P (κ > 6;H)P (H) + P (κ < −6; H¯)P (H¯), (10)
where we have exchanged the conditioned probabilities for obtaining strong evidence
for the probability of obtaining strong evidence for the correct hypothesis. Obviously
P (Strong correct) ≤ P (|κ| > 6) as it should. Just as the sensitivity can be used to evaluate
the performance of future experiments in the frequentist approach, probabilities such as this
may be used to judge the merits of future experiments within a Bayesian approach. For
example, we may judge experiments on the basis of their probability to give a certain level
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of evidence or on the evidence that the median experiment will provide. Below we will give
examples of such performance indicators.
Note that Eq. (10) does not assume H or H¯ to be true (as was done in Ref. [68]), but
is rather a weighted average of the results from both hypotheses with the weights given
by the prior degree of belief in H and H¯, respectively. In the remainder of this paper,
we will consider the situation where an equal prior probability of 0.5 has been assigned
to both hypotheses. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that it is important to refrain
from interpreting κ or posterior degree of belief p in terms of a number of σ, which is an
inherently frequentist concept not present in a Bayesian analysis. The number of σ at which a
frequentist analysis would reject a hypothesis is dependent on the p-value, the probability of
obtaining a result more extreme than the observed one if the hypothesis is true. In contrast,
the p computed in this Bayesian framework is the degree of belief that the hypothesis is
true after an experiment is performed. These two concepts are fundamentally different and
should not be confused.
B. Normal distributed indicators
In some limiting cases, the indicator T will follow a normal distribution for both H and H¯
with the same standard deviation. This limit is well fulfilled, e.g., for future reactor neutrino
experiments sensitive to the neutrino mass ordering as discussed in Refs. [68, 69]. For easy
applicability to this scenario, we will assume that T = N(±T0, 2
√
T0), where N(µ, σ) is a
normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ and the + (−) is for NO (IO).
Clearly, any indicator which supplies normal distributions for T can be brought to this form
by translations and rescalings as long as they have the same standard deviation. For the
particular case of the neutrino mass ordering at reactors, we also have T0 = ∆χ2, i.e., the
∆χ2 = minH¯ χ
2 − minH χ2 for the Asimov data set for H [74], i.e., the data set where all
observables are given by their expectation values.
Since the cumulative distribution and probability density functions of the normal distri-
bution are known, we can obtain simple analytic expressions for several of the quantities
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and distributions mentioned above, in particular
κ(t) = t, (11)
P (κ > κ0;H) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
κ0 − T0
2
√
2T0
)]
, (12)
F (p) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
2 log p
1−p
− T0
2
√
2T0
)]
, (13)
f(p) =
1√
2piT0
1
p(1− p) exp

−
(
2 log p
1−p
− T0
)2
8T0

 . (14)
Here, F (p) and f(p) are the cumulative distribution and probability density functions for p
(before the experiment is performed, once an observation has been made p is fixed) assuming
that H is true, respectively. Thus, by definition
P (κ > κ0;H) = 1− F
(
1
1 + e−κ0/2
)
= P (κ < −κ0; H¯), (15)
where the last equality follows from symmetry, which agrees with Eq. (12). The probability
density function f(p) is the analytic form of what is shown in the left panel of Fig. 3 in
Ref. [68]. Note that since the probability of obtaining evidence at least at level κ0 for the
true hypothesis in this case is independent of the hypothesis (this is true for all cases where
the indicator is anti-symmetric under the exchange of H and H¯) and thus
P (evidence at least κ0 for true hypothesis) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
κ0 − T0
2
√
2T0
)]
. (16)
Note that this quantity is the probability of obtaining evidence at least at level κ0 for the
true hypothesis before the experiment has been performed. Of course, once the experiment
has been performed, we either have found the evidence or not. In particular, the quantity
P (κ > 0;H) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(√
T0
8
)]
(17)
is the probability that the experimental outcome will favor the correct ordering. A priori,
this quantity has little to do with the actual posterior odds assigned to H and H¯ as claimed
in Ref. [69]. If the experiment then measures t = 0 + ε, the posterior odds will be close to
one (equal degree of belief in H and H¯) regardless of T0. In other terms, the experiment
did not provide us with significant discrimination between H and H¯ although we might or
might not have expected it to do so. This is neither strange nor unwanted. In fact, this is
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FIG. 1: The probability of obtaining strong or very strong evidence (corresponding to a posterior
degree of belief of 95.3% and 99.3%, respectively, according to the Kass–Raftery scale) for the
correct ordering in an experiment with Gaussian distributions for the indicator T as a function of
T0. For reference, the dash-dotted blue curve shows the probability of actually favoring the correct
ordering.
how we want the posterior odds to behave. If the results are essentially as likely in H as
in H¯, then a small shift in the experimental outcome should not significantly change our
interpretation of the experiment. Of more interest is the probability of actually obtaining
strong (95.3%) or very strong (99.3%) evidence for the correct hypothesis, we show these
probabilities as a function of T0 in Fig. 1.
To conclude this section, let us finally note that, since erf(0) = 0, the median experiment
will give evidence of strength κ = T0. This can be understood from the facts that κ(t) = t
and T is symmetric around ±T0.
IV. EXAMPLE OF A NON-GAUSSIAN SITUATION
As mentioned earlier, the general case is typically not analytically solvable but instead we
must apply numerical simulations in a fashion similar to that found in frequentist statistics,
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Parameter Central value Prior
θ23 45
◦ Constant
θ12 33
◦ Constant
sin2(2θ13) 0.1 Constant
∆m221 7.9 · 10−5 eV2 Constant
∆m231 ±2.4 · 10−3 eV2 Gaussian ±10%
δ – Flat, cyclic
TABLE II: Priors on the oscillation parameters used in our simulated non-Gaussian scenario study-
ing the NOνA experiment.
where one in general must simulate the distribution of the test statistic. However, contrary
to the frequentist framework, the appearance of a probability measure on the parameters
means that we will only need to perform one simulation for each hypothesis, rather than once
for every parameter set. This detail in itself offers a significant reduction in the computing
power needed to perform a test. In particular, the actual testing once the experiment has
been performed turns into a simple matter of averaging the likelihood of the acquired data
over each hypothesis to find the hypothesis likelihood and, through it, the posterior odds.
In this section, we will give an example of a situation where non-gaussianities play a role
in the form of a simulation of the NOνA experiment [75]. In order to perform this analysis
we will utilize the GLoBES software [76, 77] along with selected parts of the MonteCUBES
plug in [78]. Since we are mainly concerned with the statistical challenges, we simply use the
predefined NOνA glb files from the GLoBES homepage [53, 79] to describe the experiment.
For the neutrino oscillation parameters and their priors we impose the conditions displayed
in Tab. II. We only allow ∆m231 and δ to vary and fix the rest of the parameters. Again, this
is done mainly for illustration purposes and in fact the deviation of θ23 from its maximal
value is an additional challenge for future oscillation experiments, which we will comment
on more later. In addition, note that we use these priors only for sampling the parameters in
order to find the indicator distributions. We then follow the steps described in the previous
section in order to compute these distributions.
In Fig. 2, we show the cumulative distribution and probability density functions of the
indicator T = minIO χ
2 − minNO χ2 (we here use the built-in GLoBES χ2 function, which
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FIG. 2: Cumulative distribution (top panel) and probability density (bottom panel) functions for
TNO (solid curves) and TIO (dashed curves), respectively, in our simulation of the NOνA experiment
as described in the text. The non-gaussianities are clearly visible in asymmetry in the top panel
and the large tails of the bottom panel. The thick curves correspond to the result of full simula-
tion while the thin curves correspond to the distributions obtained in the semi-analytic Gaussian
approximation (see Sect. IVA).
is −2 logL for a given parameter set). As can be seen from the figure, the main difference
from a Gaussian distribution is the appearance of large tail distributions in the direction of
the simulated ordering. These tails arise mainly from regions of parameter space where the
hierarchies are well separated. In this case, values of δ = ±pi/2 are either close to the other
ordering or the ones furthest removed from it. If the value of δ is such that it will be easy to
separate the hierarchies, then we have a significant chance of obtaining evidence for the true
ordering. However, this is where the prior on the parameter space of the models come into
play and properly weights the probabilities of being in different regions of parameter space.
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FIG. 3: The solid curve shows the value of κ as a function of the measured value of the indicator
T = minIO χ
2 − minNO χ2 for the simulated NOνA experiment. The thin gray curve shows the
corresponding result for a Gaussian distribution. The scale on the right shows the corresponding
posterior degree of belief p in normal neutrino mass ordering.
This is in some sense similar to the gain fraction argument for CP-violation presented in
Ref. [71], with the difference that we are now performing a full Bayesian analysis. From the
probability density functions, it is now easy to construct the value of κ(t) and we show this
quantity in Fig. 3. As can be seen in this figure, the posterior odds for a given value of the
indicator T will typically be larger than the Gaussian t. This effect is due to the tails of
the probability density functions. Since κ is related to the ratio of the probability density
functions and these fall off much slower than in the Gaussian case on the side of the true
ordering, it follows that this will generally be the case. If instead we had a situation where
the tails were on the other side, then we would typically obtain weaker posterior odds for
the same t.
It should be stressed that the results shown in Fig. 3 is the only important piece of
information once the experiment has been performed as relating the measured value of
the indicator with the posterior odds is straightforward using this figure. As expected, a
measured value around t = 0 adds very little information on whether NO or IO is the true
12
one.
Finally, we will now discuss how to judge the capabilities of a future experiment within
the Bayesian framework and argue that the full distribution of the expected evidence should
be considered rather than reducing it to a single number. This will roughly correspond to the
typical sensitivity analysis that is usually performed in the frequentist setting. In order to do
this, we compute the distributions of κ under the assumptions of NO and IO. This is done by
simply inserting the indicator distributions for NO and IO, respectively, and thus obtaining
the corresponding distributions of κ. These distributions, whose cumulative distribution
functions are shown in Fig. 4, give us an estimate of what we can expect for the outcome of
the experiment. For example, we see that P (κ > 10; NO) = 1 − CDFκ,NO(10) ≃ 0.2. Thus,
the probability of NOνA presenting very strong evidence (> 99.3%) for NO if NO is true is
around 20%. Since the situation is relatively symmetric, the same is true for IO and thus
the probability of NOνA presenting very strong evidence for the true ordering is also around
20%. Also note that the probability of presenting very strong evidence for the false ordering
(< 0.7% degree of belief in the correct ordering) is miniscule. In order to compare different
possibilities for future experiments, one can either construct the equivalent of Fig. 4 for all
experiments and use them to judge the pros and cons of the different experiments. It may be
possible that experiment A provides a greater chance of obtaining at least strong evidence,
while experiment B provides a greater chance of obtaining at least very strong evidence.
The alternative is to pick a desired level of evidence and just compare the experiments’
probabilities of reaching at least that level. While the disadvantage of this procedure is a
certain loss of information, the advantage is that this single number can be plotted against,
e.g., experimental parameters such as the neutrino energy, baseline, or running time. We
wish to stress the fact that, since the shape of the distribution of κ in general will vary
depending on the experiment, a single number will typically be insufficient to describe the
full situation. For example, a Gaussian experiment with T0 = 4 would have a larger median
evidence for the true ordering than our simulated NOνA experiment. However, the chances
of getting lucky and obtain very strong evidence in such an experiment would be miniscule.
Thus, rather than tabulating several predefined numbers describing the distributions, we
would advocate simply showing the distribution and basing any comparison on how the
distributions compare.
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FIG. 4: Top panel: Probability of obtaining posterior odds corresponding to κ or higher in favor of
the correct ordering. The solid curve assumes NO, while the dashed curve assumes IO. Note that
the curves are tilted in opposite directions as IO becomes more likely as the value of κ decreases.
Bottom panel: The probability of obtaining posterior odds corresponding to K or higher in favor
of the correct ordering. We use K = κ for true NO and K = −κ for true IO in order to collect the
probability for obtaining evidence for the true ordering. As reference, the thin gray curve shows
the corresponding quantity for a Gaussian experiment with T0 = 2.2, which gives the same median
posterior odds. The scale on the top of the upper (lower) panel show the corresponding posterior
degree of belief in the normal (correct) neutrino mass ordering. The thin black curves show the
corresponding results of the semi-analytic approximation presented in Sec. IVA.
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A. Semi-analytic approximation
It was observed in Ref. [70], that for fixed values of the oscillation parameters (in partic-
ular δ), the distribution of T would still take on a Gaussian form with mean and standard
deviation now given by the T0(θ) produced by that particular parameter set θ. If this holds
and T0(θ) is known, then the probability density function of T will be given by
LNO(T ) =
∫
piNO(θ)LT0(θ)(T )dθ, (18)
where
LT0(t) =
1√
8piT0
exp
(
−(t− T0)
2
8T0
)
(19)
is the probability density function of N(T0, 2
√
T0) and the corresponding expressions hold
for inverted ordering. If T0(θ) has the same distribution in both hierarchies, i.e.,
piNO(θ)
dθ
dT0
dT0 = piIO(θ¯)
dθ¯
dT0
dT0 ≡ pi(T0)dT0 (20)
for all T0, then
LNO(t) = exp
(
t
4
)∫
pi(T0)
1√
8piT0
exp
(
−t
2 + T 20
8T 20
)
dT0, (21)
LIO(t) = exp
(
− t
4
)∫
pi(T0)
1√
8piT0
exp
(
−t
2 + T 20
8T 20
)
dT0. (22)
It follows directly that also in this case,
κ(t) = 2 log
(LNO(t)
LIO(t)
)
= t. (23)
This is a generalization of the result found in Eq. (11) and any deviations from this re-
sult must be caused by non-Gaussianities or different distributions of T0(θ) in the different
orderings.
The largest deviation from this appeared for the case of the NOνA experiment, which is
the example we have been using so far in this work. For comparison, we show the expectation
of this semi-analytic approximation with thin curves in the lower panel of Fig. 2. As can be
seen, the approximation overestimates the value of the probability density function where the
ordering is not the assumed one, while it underestimates it in the other tail. For producing
this result, we have computed T0 as a function of δ for both hierarchies independently and
the results do not provide the same T0 distributions although it is close enough for κ(t) not
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to show any significant deviations from t for |t| < 20. Thus, the deviations from this rule
seen in Fig. 3 originate mainly from the non-Gaussianity of the NOνA distributions. Thus,
using this semi-analytic approach for NOνA will therefore lead to conservative estimates of
the NOνA capabilities. We also show the result of the approximation as thin black curves
in Fig. 4. This figure confirms our expectation that the approximation will underestimate
the capability of NOνA, although the main features such as the larger tail probability are
still present, the probability of reaching a good degree of belief may be underestimated by
as much as 10%.
B. Prior dependence
Just as with any Bayesian statement, the distribution of the posterior odds prior to
an experiment is performed will typically be dependent on the parameter prior within the
models. In the situation described above, the main prior impact arises from the flat prior on
δ, while the actual prior chosen for ∆m231 does not change the prediction significantly. This
mainly occurs since the probability of generating data that will separate the hierarchies is
highly δ dependent. This only reflects the fact that when considering what future experiment
to built, the current knowledge of the model parameters should also be taken into account
(see also Ref. [71]). For the CP-violating phase, most people would agree that a flat prior
is a reasonable starting point as long as no data is available to favor one region of δ or the
other. However, once there is a hint for a value of δ, it is only natural that the perceived
probability of making a given measurement should change accordingly.
The prior dependence would play an even bigger role in a situation where there is no
lower bound on the effect that is being searched for. In the case of the mass ordering,
∆m231 = 0 has long since been ruled out. However, for the determination of the octant
of θ23, the data of global fits are still very compatible with maximal mixing. Of course,
the possibility to discriminate between the octants is crucially dependent on how far from
maximal θ23 is allowed to be and a prior which allows larger deviations will typically give a
more optimistic prediction for the capabilities of an experiment to discover the octant. Let
us also note that if the parameter knowledge is not very precise, leading to good perceived
chances of a discovery, and a discovery is later not made once the experiment is performed,
the experiment should still typically not be considered a failure as it then will tend to
16
Po
sit
iv
e
St
ro
ng
V
er
y 
str
on
g
Fa
lse
 P
os
iti
ve
K
1−
CD
F(
K)
−4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p [%]
  25   50   75   90   95   99 99.7
FIG. 5: The same as the lower panel of Fig. 4, but with a prior that fixes δ to the most pessimistic
values for the purposes of mass ordering determination.
disfavor those parts of parameter space where a discovery would be easy, thus providing a
better prior as input for the next experiment.
As an example of the dependence on the prior, we show the case where δ is fixed to 90◦
in NO and −90◦ in IO in Fig. 5. Due to these points being almost degenerate, essentially
no chance remains for obtaining any level of reliable evidence for which ordering is the true
one through the NOνA experiment.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have discussed and given concrete examples of how to apply a Bayesian analysis to
the problem of neutrino mass ordering determination. In doing so, we have described the
correct procedures to obtain the Bayesian posterior odds for any experiment and discussed
how Bayesian methods may be used to judge the capabilities of future neutrino oscillation
experiments by extending the approach and argumentation presented by Qian et al. [68].
In short, before an experiment is performed, one may speak only about the expected dis-
tribution of the posterior odds of the two different orderings. Here, the actual value of the
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indicator, typically taken to be ∆χ2 = minIO χ
2 − minNO χ2, and not only its sign is of
importance. We want to point out that this is precisely what we would expect in a Bayesian
setting, as changing a measurement by a small amount from ∆χ2 = ε to −ε should not
change the results significantly. We contrast this to the situation presented by Ciuffoli et
al. Ref. [69], where the ordering is identified as normal if ∆χ2 > 0 and the probability of
obtaining ∆χ2 > 0 is taken as the confidence level. This corresponds to attempting to
determine the confidence level in a frequentist fashion, i.e., asking the question of how large
the ratio of infinitely repeated experiments would arrive at the correct ordering. In the
frequentist nomenclature, this is simply a computation of the confidence level provided by
a test which takes zero as the critical value. As we have shown, in the symmetric Gaussian
approximation, this probability only corresponds to the chance of the correct ordering being
favored after the experiment is performed and says nothing about how favored it has to
be (just that it has to be above 50%). A more interesting question than this would be to
ask for the probability that an experiment will give at least strong or very strong evidence
for the correct ordering, corresponding to a posterior degree of belief of at least 95.3% and
99.3%, respectively, which we have also computed for the case of a Gaussian distribution of
the indicator.
The second question of Ref. [69] regards the confidence level obtained by a typical exper-
iment. This is somewhat misguided, since confidence is an inherent frequentist concept and
what is interesting in the Bayesian framework is simply the posterior odds. In particular,
what is interpreted in Ref. [69] as the probability of success is actually the posterior prob-
ability of the correct ordering, which the authors then go on to interpret as a frequentist
p-value. While the p-value in a frequentist setting is the probability of obtaining a more
extreme result, the posterior probability evaluated for the median experiment is the degree
of belief in the correct ordering if the data would turn out to be the median expected data.
Here we have also argued against the use of a number of σ for describing the strength of the
evidence, since in the frequentist nomenclature the neutrino community is familiar with, this
represents a measure of how much the data deviates from the expectation and not the degree
of belief in a model. The third question raised in Ref. [69] is asking what the probability
of achieving a certain level of evidence (although it is referred to as confidence), we have
discussed this extensively throughout this text and the main results include Eq. (16) for the
Gaussian approximation and Fig. 4 for the simulation of NOνA.
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In addition to the above, we have given examples of how to perform the full Bayesian
analysis both analytically for the case where a Gaussian distribution can be assumed as well
as numerically in the case of non-Gaussian distributions. Non-Gaussian distributions will
typically result from appearance experiments where the value of the CP-violating phase δ
is of importance. We have illustrated this by performing a simplified analysis of what may
be expected from the NOνA experiment and seen that the appearance of large tails in the
distribution functions imply that values of ∆χ2 typically give stronger evidence than for the
Gaussian case. For the case of composite hypotheses composed of simple hypotheses with
Gaussian distributions of the indicator, we have also provided a semi-analytic approach to
slightly simplify the computation of the indicator distributions for the full hypothesis. In
the very end, we discussed the impact of priors in the Bayesian analysis and argued that the
prior dependence is not necessarily a bad thing when it comes to decision making for future
experiments, since their capabilities should be based on our current knowledge and beliefs
about the true values of the underlying physics.
Let us finally remark that this analysis by no means is specific for the neutrino mass
ordering. It is equally appropriate also for other binary measurements such as which octant
θ23 belongs to, or any other binary (or even larger degeneracies) measurement in physics.
In particular, it should be expected that the octant degeneracy of θ23 displays even more
non-Gaussian behavior since, unlike for the neutrino mass ordering, the degenerate solutions
are very weakly separated.
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